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RECENT CASES
ABATEMENT AND REVIVAL-EFFECT OF DEATH OF TORT-FEASOR UPON
RIGHT OF ACTION-An action was brought against the administrator of a de-
ceased tort-feasor for the recovery of damages for a tort committed in the tort-
feasor's lifetime by bombing the plaintiff's dwelling house, and inflicting injuries
on plaintiff's wife. Held, that the cause of action survived the decease of the
tort-feasor and could be maintained against his personal representative. Waller
v. First Savings & Trust Co., 138 So. 780 (Fla. 1931).
Underlying the old common law rule that all tort actions were defeated by
the death of the tort-feasor'- was the theory that a tort action was punitive in
character and resembled a criminal proceeding and that it was no longer necessary
or possible to chastise the perpetrator.2  Although this rule was early modified
by statutes providing that the personal representatives of the injured might sue
the personal representative of the wrongdoer where injury to real or personal
property was concerned," it is comparatively recently that legislative enactments
permit the survival of causes of action for injuries to the person.4 Indeed there
are still numerous codifying statutes which provide that actions for "injuries to
the person" may not be maintained after the death of the injured or of the
wrongdoer.5 The statute in the instant case provided that "all actions for per-
sonal injuries shall die with the person, to wit: Assault and battery, slander,
false imprisonment and malicious prosecution; all other actions shall and may
be maintained in the name of the representatives of the deceased".6 That the
right of action for damages to the plaintiff's property survived was clear. How-
ever, the court, uncertain as to whether the husband's action for loss of marital
services was an action for personal injuries which abated within the meaning of
the statute, finally based its decision ' on the ground that all actions for personal
injuries other than those enumerated survived and therefore this action could
Lt brought against the administrator. The court further reinforced its con-
clusion by determining that the statute only dealt with the effect of the death of
the plaintiff and not of the defendant; and in a very interesting opinion stated
that the common law of abatement was also inapplicable since it was inconsistent
with the organic laws of the state which guaranteed the use of the courts to all
persons seeking a "remedy" for injuries sustained. That a desirable result was
achieved in this narrow interpretation of the statute is evident when we recognize
the growing doctrine that a tort action is essentially compensatory rather than
punitive.8 However it would appear that the court could have reached the
same conclusion though admitting that the statute intended to abate all actions
for personal injuries, by subscribing to the proposition that the husband's action
'Putnam v. Savage, 244 Mass. 83, 138 N. E. 8o8 (1923); Michigan Central Railroad v.
Vreeland, --27 U. S. 59, 33 Sup. Ct. 192 (1913).2 POLLocC, TORTS (Ilth ed. 192o) 62: "At one time it may have been justified by the
vindictive and quasi-criminal character of suits for civil injuries. A process which is still
felt to be a substitute for private war may seem incapable of being continued on behalf of or
against a dead man's estate."
3 4 EDWARD III, c. 7 (1330) ; 3 & 4 WILLIAm IV, c. 42 (1833).
"Chubbrick v. Holloway, 234 N. W. 314 (Minn. 1931); In re Grainger's Estate, 237
N. W. 153 (Neb. 1931).
'Demczuk v. Jenifer, 138 Md. 488, 114 Atl. 471 (1921) ; Smith v. Lehigh Valley R. Co.,
232 Pa. 456, 81 At]. 554 (1911).
'FLA. GEN. LAWS (Skillman 1927) 4211.
'Two justices dissenting.
S POLLOCK, Op. cit. supra note 2, 61.
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for loss of marital services is not an action for "injuries to the person" within
the meaning of the statute, an interpretation accorded similar statutes by other
courts. 9
BANKS AND BANKING-PARAMOUNT DUTY OF BANK OFFICER TO BANK
OVER DUTY TO SOME OTHER CORPORATION OF WHICH HE Is ALSO AN OFFI-
CER-Mr. Mills was the vice-president of the insolvent bank, and also an officer
of the defendant company. Knowing of the insolvency of the bank, he with-
drew the defendant's account. This is an action by the Superintendent of Banks
te recover the amounts so withdrawn. Held, that the defendant must return
the preference as Mr. Mills' first duty was to the bank, and defendant could
not take advantage of its breach. State of Ohio, qx rel. Fulton, Superintendent
of Banks v. The City Auto Stamping Co., Court of Common Pleas of Lucas
County, Ohio, decided February 15, 1932.
The-principal case can adequately be sustained without reference to the
unusual and far-reaching theory of paramount duty owing to a bank which
the court uses. Corporate officers occupy a fiduciary relationship to the corpora-
tion they represent.' As an incident of that relationship, an officer cannot let
any private interest. conflict with his duty to the corporation. 2 When any cor-
poration becomes insolvent, it becomes the duty of the officers to preserve the
assets for the benefit of creditors, 3 and any attempt by the officers to create a
preference either in favor of themselves or some third party, is a breach of
fiduciary duty for which the offending party can be held accountable.4 In the
nrincipal case, the defendant undoubtedly was the recipient of a preference over
other depositors.5 This benefit was brought about by its own agent, and in
its behalf, and consequently, the defendant was chargeable with notice of the
mreans by which the transaction was consummated.6 Since the defendant was
not an innocent party, there was no more injustice in requiring it to return the
money in question,7 than there would be in making the agent return his own
D Hey v. Prime, 197 Mass. 274, 84 N. E. 141 (19o8) ; Smith v. Lehigh Valley R. Co.,
supra note 5; see Howard v. Lunaburg, 192 Wis. 507, 213 N. W. 301 (1927). Contra:
Demczuk v. Jenifer, supra note 5; cf. Mulvey v. Boston, 197 Mass. 178, 83 N. E. 402 (9o8).
In Fowlie v. First Minneapolis Trustl Co., 237 N. W, 846 (Minn. 1931) where the statute
referred to "causes of action arising out of injury to the person" it was held that this did
not include a husband's right of action for expenses incurred in the care of his injured wife.
(Italics supplied.)
'TAYLOR, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (4th ed. 9o2) § 612.
' Paw Paw Savings Bank v. Free, 2o5 Mich. 52, 171 N. W. 464 (I919) ; Sharpe v.
Wright, 88 Okla. 16, 211 Pac. 7o (1922); Brown v. Farmers etc., National Bank, 88 Tex.
265, 31 S. W. 285 (1895) ; I MIcHIE, BANKS AND BANKING (913) § 54 (6).
'Heim v. Jobes, 14 F. (2d) 29 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926) ; Arnold v. Knapp, 75 W. Va. 8o4,
84 S. E. 895 (9,5).
'German Savings Bank v. Wulfekuhler, 19 Kan. 6o (1887); Julius v. Walcott, 113
Okla. 7, 237 Pac. 605 (925) ; I MICHIE, op. cit. supra note 2, § 54 (6).
*The evidence clearly showed that Mr. Mills intended that the defendant company be
preferred to other depositors. The transfer of the account to another bank was not done
in the usual course of business, and unusual means were employed for the sake of speed, so
that the transfer could be completed before the plaintiff bank closed its doors.
'2 MECHEm, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) § 38o3 et seq.
'Julius v. Walcott, supra note 4, held that a preference secured to a minor's estate by
the president of the bank, which president was also the guardian of the minor, was void.
Cf. Leach v. Beazley, 2O Iowa 337, 207 N. W. 374 (1926), where the court held that a
bank officer could withdraw funds of an estate of which he is the executor, even though he
knows that the bank is insolvent. This extreme result is reached by attempting to differ-
entiate between the executor's duty to the estate, and his duty to the bank, the court finding
a greater duty to the estate as an officer of the court. The court in the principal case leans
heavily on this decision to substantiate its doctrine of paramount duty to a bank. In
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account, if he had withdrawn it." There seems to be little authority to justify
the strong statements made by the court as to the relative duties owed by men
in the dual capacity of bank officer and officer in a non-banking corporation.
Since a more obvious and more authoritative concept covers such factual situa-
tions, it is better to discard a distinction, the maintenance of which must of neces-
sity compel courts to formulate a different rule for each new set of facts.9
CONFLICT OF LAWS--ATTACHMENT OF STOCK IN FOREIGN CORPORATION-
A creditor brought suit in Massachusetts against a non-resident debtor domiciled
in New York and attempted to reach and apply the shares the debtor held in
a Delaware corporation, doing business in Massachusetts and also his right to the
transfer to him of several thousand shares of treasury stock of the corporation.
The certificates of stock were not within the state where suit was brought. Held,
that neither the stock nor the right to transfer of treasury stock in the foreign
corporation could be attached outside the state of incorporation. Kliiig v. Mc-
Tarnahan, 178 N. E. 831 (Mass. 1931).
It is a familiar principle that a corporation exists only at its domicile 1 and
that stock held therein is attachable there alone 2 although officers of the corpora-
tion are within a foreign state 3 engaged in carrying on corporate business. The
decision of the instant case clearly conforms to this view. 4 The reasoning upon
Swentzel v. Penn Bank, 147 Pa. 140, 23 At. 4o5 (i89n), it was held that a director of a bank
on the verge of closing, cannot withdraw money of a firm of which he is a member, as it
cannot take advantage of the information obtained by the director in his confidential relation
to the bank.
8 I MICHrE, op. cit. supra note 2, § 54 (6) and cases cited.
9Leach v. Beazley, supra note 7, is an excellent example of what the courts would have
to contend with. After stating in no uncertain terms the paramount duty of a bank officer
to the bank, it nevertheless made an exception for that factual situation. Would not the
court find itself in much greater difficulty in cases where one man is an officer or director
in two banks? It seems obvious that the distinction based on a relative duty theory could not
apply. Yet such cases can be answered under rules already discussed, as it was in Blount
County Bank v. Harvey, 2,5 Ala. 566, 112 So. 139 (1927).
' BrEAE, THE LAw OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS (904) § 71; GooDRicn, CONFLICT OF
LAWS (1927) 61; CONFLICT OF LAws REsTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 93o) § 42.
2At common law there could be no levy of execution on shares of stock. Statutes gen-
erally provide that shares shall be subject to levy of execution. 2 COOK, CORPORATONS (8th
.ed. 1923) § 482; HELTWELa, STOCK AND STOCKBROKERS (1903) § 396.
An attachment, being entirely statutory, can be levied only when the statute declares
that an attachment may be levied on such property. Gundry v. Reakirt, 173 Fed. 167 (C. C.
E. D. Pa. i9og); Plimpton v. Bigelow, 93 N. Y. 592 6oz (1883); DRAKE, ATTACH1MENT
(7th ed. 1891) § 244.
*Gundry v. Reakirt, supra note 2; Ashley v. Quintard, 9o Fed. 84 (C. C. N. D. Ohio
1898) ; New Jersey Sheep & Wool Co. v. Traders' Deposit Bank, 1o4 Ky. 9o, 46 S. W. 677
(1898) ; Plimpton v. Bigelow, supra note z; 2 CooK, op. cit. supra note 2, § 485; BEALE, op.
cit. supra note I, § 376; Bailey, Situs of Choses in Action (1897) I HMv. L. REv. 95, III.
It has been held that the presence of the stock certificate within the foreign jurisdiction
does not permit an attachment upon them. Christmas v. Biddle, 13 Pa. 223 (1850) ; Smith
v. Downey, 8 Ind. App. 179, 35 N. E. 568 (1893) ; Armour Bros. Banking Co. v. St. Louis
National Bank, 113 Mo. 12, 20 S. W. 69o (i89z). Several courts have held, however, that
the statute in their state permits an attachment of certificates of stock in a foreign corpora-
tion. Sinipson v. Jersey City Contracting Co., 165 N. Y. 193, 58 N. E. 896 (19oo) ; General
Motors Corp. v. Ver Linden, 199 App. Div. 375, 192 N. Y. Supp. 28 (192); Puget Sound
National Bank v. Mather, 6o Minn. 362, 62 N. W. 396 (1,95); Note (1911) 25 HARv. L.
REv. 74; Note (ii6) 3o HA~v. L. IEv. 486.
'The portion of the opinion of the instant case devoted to the matter of the plaintiff's
power to reach and apply the defendant's right to a transfer of stock in the foreign corpora-
tion is in accord with the general principle that a court will decline to take jurisdiction over
matters relating to internal affairs of a foreign corporation. See BEALE, op. cit. supra note I,
§ 300 et seq.
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which this rule is posited ascribes to the share of stock a legal situs for purposes
of attachment at the place of incorporation,' hence no res is discoverable else-
where.0 On the other hand, for purposes of taxation, a share of stock was
frequently regarded as having its location at the domicile of the owner, in addition
to that of the corporation. 7 Starting with various forms of choses-in-action, s
recently extended to shares of stock,9 the Supreme Court of the United States
has definitely stated that the situs of all intangibles for purposes of a succession
tax is exclusively at the domicile of the owner. While it is evident that in these
cases the court overruled prior decisions 10 in an effort to avoid the possibility
of double taxation, 1 the question is presented as to whether the decision in the
First National Bank of Boston v. State of Maine 12 does not herald a new point
of departure with reference to problems involving the location of shares of stock.
If this decision is intended to indicate that the domicile of the owner has the sole
power over the stock, then the rule that stock is attachable only at the domicile
of the corporation may well undergo a drastic change. Keeping in mind, how-
ever, the large degree of control which the state of incorporation is deemed to
possess over the corporations it creates, 13 the court with consistency could limit
the ambit of its decision to matters of taxation.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- POWER OF LEGISLATURE To REINSTATE BY SPECIAL
ACT ATTORNEY SUSPENDED BY THE COURT-POWER OF LEGISLATURE To AP-
POINT ATToRNEY-AT-LAw-Petitioner, an attorney-at-law, had been suspended
from practice. He petitioned the court for reinstatement on the basis of a special
"Barber v. Morgan, 84 Conn. 618, 8o Atl. 791 (IgII) ; Fahry v. Milwaukee & Chicago
Breweries, 113 Ill. App. 525 (1904) ; Matter of James, 144 N. Y. 6, 38 N. E. 96I (1894);
HLLWELL, op. cit. supra note 2, § 398.
'The jurisdiction of a court to apply property of a foreign debtor to the payment of an
alleged claim is ,founded on the presence of the res within the control of the court. The
fulfillment of this essential is marked with difficulty when the subject matter of the attaching
process is an intangible chose in action. Much of theoretical discussion has centered about
the query as to the situs of the intangible and as to whether it follows the creditor or
debtor. See GOODRmicH, op. cit. supra note I, at 124 et seq.; WAPLEs, ATTAcHmENT AND
GARNISHMENT (2d ed. 1895) § 465; Beale, The Exercise of Jurisdiction In Rein to Compel
Payment of a Debt (1913) 27 HARv. L. REV. lo7; Carpenter, Jurisdiction Over Debts (1917)
31 HARv. L. REv. 905, 909.
"Hawley v. City of Malden, 232 U. S. 1 (II4) ; State v. Kidd, 125 Ala. 413, 28 So.
480 (1899) (property tax at domicile of stockholer) ; Corry v. Baltimore, 196 U. S. 466
(i9o5) ; State v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 70 Conn. 590, 40 Atl. 465 (I898) (property tax im-
posed by incorporating state); In re Hodges' Estate, 170 Cal. 492, 150 Pac. 344 (1915)
(inheritance tax at domicile of decedent stockholder) ; In re Hallenbeck's Estate, 231 N. Y.
409, 132 N. E. 131 (1921) (inheritance tax imposed by incorporating state). See Note
(0930) 78 U. OF PA. L. REv. 532; (1931) So U. OF PA. L. REv. 135.
'Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 28D U. S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct. 98 (I93o)
(negotiable bonds and certificates of indebtedness issued by municipalities) ; Baldwin et al.
v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 50 Sup. Ct. 436 (930) (bank deposits, coupon bonds, promissory
notes) ; Beidler et al. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 282 U. S. 1, 51 Sup. Ct. 54
(193o) (unsecured open accounts).
'First National Bank of Boston v. State of Maine, 52 Sup. Ct. 174 (1932).
" Cases supra note 8; Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189, 23 Sup. Ct. 277 (1903) ; Frick
v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473, 45 Sup. Ct. 6o3 (1925) ; Blodgett v. Silverman, 277 U. S. I,
48 Sup. Ct. 420 (1928).
'Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, supra note 8, at 212; Baldwin et al. v.
Missouri, mpra note 8. at 593; First National Bank of Boston v. State of Maine, supra note
9, at 176. See Note (1930) 43 HARv. L. REV. 792.
The court in all these decisions held bi-taxation to be repugnant to the Fourteenth
Amendment.
'Supra note 9.
"BALE, op. cit. supra note 1, § 300 et seq.; Cahill, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corpora-
tions and Individuals Who Carry on Business Within the Territory (1917) 30 HARv. L.
REv. 676.
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act of legislature which restored his license to him. Held, that the statute is
unconstitutional. State v. Cannon, 24o N. W. 441 (Wis, 1932).
This statute was clearly invalid for two reasons. First, the power of the
legislature must be exercised through general laws which will apply to all alike
and accord equal opportunity to all.' This act singled out the petitioner and
assumed to confer upon him a special privilege. For that reason it directly
violated the equality clauses of the Wisconsin constitution.2 Second, the doctrine
as to the separation of powers of the government into three distinct departments
is considered sufficient to prevent the legislature from exercising any judicial
function whfatsoever, except such as may in terms be allowed to it by the constitu-
tion itself.3  Since this statute acted directly to reverse a specific decision of the
supreme court of the state, it was invalid as an attempted encroachment upon the
powers of the judicial department.4 However, the court advanced as a further
reason for invalidating the statute the argument that the legislature had no
power to appoint attorneys; that, although the constitution was silent upon the
subject, and although the legislature had the right to prescribe general qualifica-
tions for attorneys under its power to regulate for the good of the people,' the
ultimate power to appoint attorneys was inherent in the courts. This view, which
is supported by the numerical weight of authority, is a modern manifestation
of the old doctrine that there is a law higher and apart from the constitution,
an ultimate source of authority, the so-called "natural law". 7 Perhaps the
strongest argument that can be offered to support the theory of inherent power
in the court is that for centuries the courts have been exercising the power of
appointment'and suspension, in most instances without legislative authorization.8
But to argue that the exercise of the power constitutes a grant of the power is,
figuratively speaking, to lift oneself by one's own boot-straps. On the other
hand, such a theory is inconsistent with the prevailing concept of the state
government which regards as vested in the legislature all power not expressly
withheld by the state constitution. Neither the executive nor the judiciary can
exercise any authority or power, except such as is clearly granted by the con-
stitution, while the legislature may exercise all power not denied it in the con-
stitution.' Hence, since the constitution does not expressly grant to the courts
'COOLEY, CONSTITTIONAL LilATiTOAl s (6th ed. 1890) 153; cf. Maynard v. Hill, 125
U. S. I9O, 8 Sup. Ct. 723 (1888). in which a divorce granted by the legislature -vas upheld
on the ground that long acquiescence in this type of action by the legislature is evidence that
the subject was considered by the people as properly within the legislative control.
The once almost universal practice of incorporating by special act has now been done
away with by general corporation acts enacted, in, some cases, under constitutional pro-
visions forbidding special acts. .
2 In re Application of Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227 N. W. 179 (1929); see Dent v.
West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 121, 9 Sup. Ct. 231, 233 (1889) ; State v. Benzenberg, ior
Wis. 172, 76 N. W. 345 (1898) ; State v. Whitcom, 122 Wis. Iio, 99 N. W. 468 (19o4).
'Maxwell v. Goetschius, 4o N. J. L. 383 (1878).
'Dorsey v. Dorsey, 37 Md. 64 (1872); Denny v. Mattoon, 2 Allen 361 (Mass. 1861);
'Ervine's Appeal, 16 Pa. 256 (1851).
'Ex parte Garland, 71 U. S. 333, 379 (1866); Vernon County Bar Association v.
McKibbin, 153 Wis. 350, 353, 141 N. W. 283 (1913).
'Vernon County Bar Association v. McKibbin, supra note 5. An interesting situation
is presented in In re Goodell, 48 Wis. 693, 81 N. W. 551 (1879), where, after a woman had
-been denied admission to the bar by the court, an act was passed providing that no person
should be denied a license because of sex. The court then admitted the woman applicant
saying that although it alone had the inherent power to admit to the bar, out of deterence
to the legislative act, Miss- Goodell should be admitted.
See opinion of Justice Chase in Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386-389 (U. S. 1798) ; HAINES,
THE REVIvAL OF NATURAL LAW CONcEPTS (I930), c. IV; Reeder, Constitutiolal and Extra-
Constitutional Restraints (1913) 61 U. OF PA. L. REv. 441, 446; Pollock, The History of the
Law of Nature (igoi) I CoL. L. REv. II.
'Principal case at 445-448.
CooLEY, op. cit. supra note I; at 206; Field v. People, 2 Scam. (Ill.) 79 (1839) ; Case
of Henry W. Cooper, 22 N. Y. 67 (186o) ; HAINES, op. cit. supra note 7, at 75.
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the power to appoint attorneys and since it does not prohibit to the legislature,
the power ultimately vests in the latter body as the governmental representatives
of the people who are, in our form of government, the source of all power.'
0
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-VALIDITY OF UNEMPLOYMENT RELIEF LEGISLA-
TION-THE "TALBOT BILL"-The legislature of Pennsylvania enacted a statute '
appropriating $io,ooo,ooo to the relief of the poor of the state to be distributed
in the form of food, fuel, shelter and clothing. The money was to be given to
the Department of Welfare which in turn was to distribute it to the directors
of the poor. The state constitution provided that, "No appropriation, except
for pensions or gratuities for military services, shall be made for charitable, edu-
cational or benevolent purposes to any person or community, nor to any denomi-
national or sectarian institution, corporation or association." 2 Held, that the
appropriation was constitutional because such an expenditure was not charitable
when it was made in the performance of a governmental duty, and because it was
not a gift to a "person or community" since all poor would benefit indiscrimi-
nately. Commonwealth of Pa. ex rel. Schnader v. Liveright, Pa. Sup. Ct., de-
cided April 7, 1932.
The general rule of statutory interpretation is that every presumption of
validity will be invoked and an act will be held unconstitutional only when mani-
festly so.3 However, if the people who have adopted a constitution expressly
limit the form of the legislation such limitation should be upheld,' no matter how
worthy may be the purpose of the legislation. It is not some obscure purpose of
the drafters of the act which is to be given effect, but the language by which
that purpose has been expressed.' Following such reasoning, statutes providing
old-age pensions 1 and donations to denominational institutions 7 have been
declared unconstitutional. In the light of these decisions it is difficult to under-
stand the reasoning of the instant case, even though it is the duty of the state
to care for its poor.$ This duty must be conducted in a nmnner which is con-
stitutional. If a means of administration is prohibited, it cannot be utilized.9
"Case of Henry W. Cooper, supra note 9; see dissenting opinion of Crownhart, J., in
State v. Cannon, 196 Wis. 534, 540, 221 N. W. 603, 6o5 (1928).
'December 28, 1931, P. L. 503, popularly termed the "Talbot Bill".
'Art. III, § 18.
'Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 8 Sup. Ct. 273 (1887) ; Sharpless v. Philadelphia,
:.1 Pa. 147 (1853); Pennsylvania R. R. v. Riblet, 66 Pa. 164 (187o).
' Collins v. Martin, 29o Pa. 388, 139 Atl. 122 (1927) ; Commonwealth v. Alden Coal Co.,
251 Pa. 134, 96 Atl. 246 (1915).
'"Courts must construe the language of the Constitution literally in the spirit in which
it is commonly understood, otherwise prejudice may crop out; and, while the debates of the
Constitutional Convention may be interesting, they can not be taken to override the ordinary
meaning of the words employed." Busser v. Snyder, 282 Pa. 44o, 128 At. So (I925). This
was the answer to the argument that the section under discussion was inserted merely to
prevent corruption and unfair discrimination. See re Walker, 49 N. D. 682, 193 N. W. 25o
(1923) ; alid State v. Buckstegge, i8 Ariz. 277, 158 Pac. 837 (1916).
'Busser v. Snyder, supra note 5.
'Collins v. Kephart, 271 Pa. 428, 117 AtI. 440 (i921) ; Collins v. Martin, supra note 4.
Appropriations to non-sectarian institutions have been upheld. Collins v. Lewis, 276 Pa.
435, 120 Atl. 389 (1923) ; cf. Busser v. Snyder, supra note 5 at 453, 128 Atl. at 84 (1925).
Retirement acts rest on theory of return for past services and are not gratuities.
'Town of Hamden v. The City of New Haven, 91 Conn. 589, I1 Atl. 11 (1917).
'Collins v. Martin, supra note 4; Griffith v. Osawkee Twp., 14 Kans. 418 (1875).
When there is no express prohibition in the constitution it is a valid exercise of the police
power of the legislature to make such regulations as it deems necessary for the health,
safety and morals of the people. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678, 8 Sup.' Ct. 992
(1887) (restriction on sale of oleomargarine); Commonwealth v. Widovich, 295 Pa. 31i,
143 Atl. 295 (1929) (sedition acts) ; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. II, 25 Sup. Ct
358 (195o) (compulsory vaccination).
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The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania cares for its poor by means of local relief
administered under the poor laws.'" Since this bill provides not for local relief
but for aid from the central government it cannot be a poor law, and although
the bill is designed to aid the poor it carries out the project by means of a direct
appropriation, a means prohibited by the Constitution. Moreover, as a strong
dissenting opinion points out, merely because all the poor within the state will
benefit equally does not make the appropriation any the less an appropriation to
the individual. This brings the appropriation directly under the constitutional
prohibition. The present decision would appear to have been dictated by social
necessity rather than an application of exact legal precepts.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-VALIDITY OF STATE "INQUIRY INTO PROPRIETY OF
INTERSTATE GAS RATES-A distributing company, doing exclusively intrastate
business, purchased its gas from an affiliated corporation engaged in interstate
business. Upon application by the local company for an increase in retail charges,
the state commission contended that reasonableness of such increase would de-
pend on the propriety of the rate at which the distributing company purchased the
gas. The distributing company appealed from the dismissal of its application
based on its refusal to furnish the requisite information. Held, that the inquiry
into the reasonableness of the wholesale charge did not constitute a regulation
of interstate commerce. Western Distributing Company v. The Public Service
Comnmission of Kansas, U. S. Sup. Ct., U. S. Daily, March I, 1932, at 2938.
It is well settled that the transmission of gas from state to state by continuous
pipe line or otherwise is an act of interstate commerce, the regulation of which
is committed exclusively to Congress under the commerce clause of the Federal
Constitution.' In view of the fact that Congress has not acted,2 the determina-
tion of how much control the states can exercise over it has become a matter of
importance. In attempting to solve it the Supreme Court has come to the arbi-
trary conclusion that where the sale is directly to the consumer the state may
regulate the rate,3 whereas if it is made to the local distributing company, the
state may not 4 ; the theory being that nationwide uniformity is required in the
latter case, but not in the former.5 In consequence of this distinction, and the
continued non-action of Congress, it is a matter of common knowledge that this
immunity has been a device by which an interstate parent company is able to
exact exorbitant rates from a subsidiary distributing company. The latter is,
of course, entitled to a fair return," and the consumer pays the whole. It is
10 PA. ST. (West, 192o) § 17003; PA. ST. (West, 192o) § 16944 et seq.
'Haskell v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 224 U. S. 217, 32 Sup. Ct. 442 (1912) ; Pennsyl-
vania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553, 43 Sup. Ct. 658 (1923) ; Peoples Natural Gas Co. v.
Public Service Commission, 270 U. S. 550, 46 Sup. Ct. 371 (926).
2 "The rates of gas companies transmitting gas in interstate commerce are not only not
regulated by Congress, but the Interstate Commerce Act expressly withholds the subject
from federal control." Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission, 252 U. S. 23,
30, 40 Sup. Ct. 279, 281 (1920) ; 41 STAT. 474 (1920), 49 U. S. C. A. § I (1929).3 Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission, supra note 2; 2 WIL.OUU(HBY,
CoNsTrruTioNAL LAw (2d ed. 1929) 432; (i92o) 68 U. OF PA. L. REV. 393.
'Public Utilities Commission v. Landon, 249 U. S. 236, 39 Sup. Ct. 268 (i919);
Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U. S. 298, 44 Sup. Ct. 544 (924) ; Public Utilities
Commission v. Attleboro Steam and Electric Co., 273 U. S. 83, 47 Sup. Ct. 294 (1927).
'Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission, supra note 2. But even where
nationwide uniformity is not required, the regulation must not be burdensome on the inter-
state commerce. Galveston, H. & S. Ry. Co. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217, 28 Sup. Ct. 638
(igo8) ; Kansas Natural Gas Co. v. West. 221 U. S. 229, 31 Sup. Ct. 564 (igI).
'Lincoln G. & E. L. Co. v. Lincoln, 223 U. S. 349, 39 Sup. Ct. 271 (1912) ; Minnesota
Rate Cases, 23o U. S. 352, 33 Sup. Ct. 729 (1913); BAUER, EFFECTIVE REGULATION OF
PUBuc UTIrrIxs (925) 253.
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against this abuse that the holding in the principal case is directed. The correct-
ness of the result can not be impeached even if it be conceded that such right of
inquiry indirectly affects interstate commerce by inducing the wholesaler to
adjust his rate to a reasonable basis, for many state regulations indirectly affect
interstate commerce without losing their validity.7  Moreover, state inquiry into
this rate seems indispensable to proper regulation, which, according to the Su-
preme Court, should be determined by a consideration of all the "relevant
facts".8 Finally, there is no reason why such inquiry should be deemed any
more burdensome on interstate commerce than the regulation allowed by the
Pennsylvania Gas 9 case of sales made directly to the consumer.
EQUITABLE CONVERSION-ADEmPTION OF LEGACIEs-OPTION ExERCISED
AFTER DEATH-Testator by his will made specific bequests of certain shares of
stock. He later granted an option over these shares which was exercised after
his death. Held, that the shares were converted with regard to the operation
upon them by the will so that the proceeds became part of the residuary estate,
only the bare legal title passing to the legatees. Re Carrington; Ralphs v.
Swithenbank, 145 L. T. 284 (Eng. I93I).
The doctrine reluctantly followed in the instant case was first laid down in
Lawes v. Bennett.- There the contract of option antedated the will, by which
the testator made a general devise of his realty, and it was held that the purchase
money fell into the residuary estate. The English courts refused to extend the
doctrine to -the case of a specific devise in a will made after the contract of
option, arguing that the testator plainly intended the devisee to take either the
land or the proceeds.2 But where the option was created after the will specifi-
cally devising the land, the doctrine of Lawes v. Bennett was applied.3 The
final step was to apply the rule to the case of an option exercised after the death
of the optionor.4 The application of equitable conversion to this type of case
has been rejected by some American courts I and criticized by text writers as
an unwarranted extension of an already questionable doctrine.6 The fiction
7 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. James, 162 U. S. 650, 16 Sup. Ct. 934 (1895) ; Mis-
souri K. & T, R. Co. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613, I8 Sup. Ct. 488 (1898).; Savage v. Jones, 225
U. S. 501, 32 Sup. Ct. 715 (1912); Higdon v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 234 U. S. 592, 34
Sup. Ct. 948 (1913).
Speaking of the ascertainment of the value of property which enters into the con-
sideration of rates, the court in Minnesota Rate cases, supra note 6, at 434, 33 Sup. Ct., at
754, said "The ascertainment of that value is not controlled by artificial rules. It is not a
matter of formulas, but there must be a reasonable judgment having its basis in a proper
consideration og all relevant facts." See also Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 18 Spp. Ct.
418 (i8).
'Supra note 2.
2I Cox Eq. Cas. 167 (1785). Accord: Townley v. Bedwell, 14 Ves. 591 (18oS) (in this
case, however, Lord Eldon began the criticism of the doctrine which has continued ever
since); Collingwood v. Row, 3 Jur. (N. s.) 785 (1857). Contra: Ingraham v. Chandler, 179
Iowa 304, 161 N. W. 434 (917).
"Drant v. Vause, I Y. & C. C. C. 580 (1842); Emuss v. Smith, 2 De G. & Sin. 722
(1848); McCanna v. Hanan, 49 R. I. 349, I42 Atl. 6og (1928).
'Weeding v. Weeding, i J. & I. 424 (1861); Newport Waterworks v. Sisson, iS R. I.
411, 28 At. 336 (1893).
'I1 re Isaacs (1894) 3 Ch. 5o6. Contra: Rockland Lime Co. v. Leary, 2o3 N. Y. 469,
97 N. E. 43 (1911) ; Smith v. Loewenstein, 5o Ohio St. 346, 34 N. E. 159 (1893) ; Bisbee's
Est., 177 Wis. 77, 187 N. W. 653 (1922); cf. Sheehey v. Scott, 128 Iowa 551, 1O4 N. W.
1139 (195o) (exercise of option would not dissolve prior attachment by creditor of the heir).
Ingraham v. Chandler, supra note i, and cases cited, supra note 4.
'Hart, The Inconsistencies of the Doctrine of Equitable Conversion (19o8) 24 L. Q.
Ray. 403, at 407; Langdell, Equitable Conversion (19o4) 18 HAgv. L. REv. i; Stone,
Equitable Conversion by Contract (113) 13 Cor- L. REV. 369, at 377.
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
of relation back is expressly repudiated by the court in the principal case, yet
it is impossible to see how the exercise of the option can affect the right of the
legatees, unless the doctrine be employed to prevent the passage of complete legal
and beneficial interest by the operation of the will at the testator's death. It is
probable that this language is an attempt to explain the obvious inconsistency
of the fact that the conversion does not affect the right of the devisee to receive
the rents and profits from realty and dividends upon stock, prior to the exercise
of the option.7
EVIDENCE-PERJURY-PROOF BY CIRCUMSTANTIAL EvIDENcE-Defendant
testified at a trial in which the federal government attempted to show X's con-
nection with a certain lottery. He stated that he knew nothing whatever concern-
ing X's relations with that operation and had never talked with X concerning it.
He was indicted for perjury. The government's evidence consisted of a knowl-
edge on his part of a previous similar operation of X, and an opportunity to speak
with X concerning the one in question. Held, that the evidence, being circtum-
stantial, could not convict defendant.1 United States v. Otto, 54 F. (2d) 277,
1931.
The great weight of authority requires the testimony of one direct witness
supported by at least circumstantial evidence to convict of perjury.' The neces-
sity for circumstantial evidence, rests on the ancient assumption that one oath
is as good as another.2 On the other hand because perjury, once deemed one of
the most heinous crimes known to the law,' was fraught with such. dire conse-
quences to the guilty, circumstantial evidence has not been considered sufficient
of it. Yet it is difficult to see why it should differ from murder, larceny and
ether crimes capable of being proved by circumstantial evidence. The real rea-
son for the rule, i. e., that a timid witness would fear to oppose his testimony to
that of a possibly revengeful and influential witness, really makes it a rule of the
quantum. of proof and not of the character of proof. The requirement of circum-
stantial evidence of two parties would meet this objection, though it is doubtful
if a witness is likely to be informed of any such rule in his favor. A few juris-
dictions allow proof of perjury by circumstantial evidence alone.4 The need for
the adoption of such a rule is demonstrated in some of these cases where although
the guilt was palpable, the subject matter was incapable of direct proof.5 New
York in such a case allowed conviction on circumstantial evidence alone,6 but
later reverted to the general rule.7 The United States Supreme Court likewise
'Collingwood v. Row, supra note I; Re Marlay [1915] 2 Ch. 264. But cf. Peoples' St.
Ry. Co. v. Spencer, 156 Pa. 85, 27 Atl. 113 (1893) (optionee entitled to fire insurance
proceeds as against optionor); Phoenixville, etc., Ry. Co.'s Appeal, 70 Pa. Super. 391
(1918) (optionee entitled to compensation for eminent domain proceedings as against
optionor).
'State v. Cortwright, 66 Ohio St. 35, 63 N. E. 590 (19o2) ; Allen v. United States, 194
Fed. 664 (C. C. A. 4th, 1912) ; Clayton v. United States, 284 Fed. 537 (C. C. A. 4th, 1922);
Goslin v. Commonwealth, 121 Ky. 698, 90 S. W. 223 (195o).
24 W ImoRE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2O40.
3 Canal Zone v. Kerr, 2 Canal Zone Sup. Ct. 262 (1913) ; State v. Cortwright; Goslin
v. Commonwealth, both supra note I.
State v. Storey, 148 Minn. 398, 182 N. W. 613 (1921) ; Ex parte Metcalf, 8 Okla. Crim.
Rep. 6o5, 129 Pac. 675 (1912); State v. Cerfoglio, 46 Nev. 332, 205 Pac. 791 (1922);
Marvel v. State, 33 Del. i1O, 131 Atl. 317 (1925) ; (126) 2o ILL. L. REv. 46.
' It is to be noted also that what one court might deem to be direct another court might
consider circumstantial evidence. The line of demarcation is not distinct.
IPeople v. Doody, 172 N. Y. I65, 64 N. E. 807 (19o2). In this case the defendant had
related to the district attorney all the facts that two days later at the trial he could not
recall.
7People ex rel Madigan v. Sturgis, iio App. Div. i, 96 N. Y. Supp. 1O46 (19o5).
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adheres to the usual principle," subject to what it considers adequate exceptionsY
It is time to recognize that the rule, if there is one, statutory 10 or otherwise "I is
really one which goes to the number of witnesses rather than the character of
their testimony. Cases like the present one might well be decided on the ground
that the evidence was not sufficiently strong to convict 12 rather than on the un-
necessarily broader rule that circumstantial evidence will not justify conviction.13
HUSBAND AND WIFE-EFFECT OF SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE OF A NEGLIGENT
EMPLOYEE TO THE INJURED PARTY ON THE LATTER'S RIGHT OF ACTION AGAINST
THE EMPLOYER-Plaintiff was injured through the negligence of an employee of
the defendant. The plaintiff subsequently married the employee and then brought
suit against the employer. Held, that the marriage did not abate the action.
Webster v. Snyder, 138 So. 755 (Fla. 1932).
At common law, as a result of the concept of the unity of the spouses,
neither spouse could maintain an action against the other.1 This rule, somewhat
modified in equity,2 has been changed in most states by the Married Women's
Acts, although the extent of the change has been the subject of some diversity of
opinion.3 In most of the- states the common law rule that one spouse could
not sue the other for a personal tort has persisted,4 and in these jurisdictions
marriage will abate an action for an injury incurred before coverture. 5 The
refusal of the courts to permit the latter action is based on a species of public
policy which fears that a contrary view would tend to disrupt the family.0 This
argument is, of course, equally applicable to any form of action between the
spouses, but it needs no deep perception to see that the fact that an action has
been brought at all seems sufficient proof that the marital unity which the court
is attempting to preserve is, in fact, no longer in existence.7 Moreover the fact
that many negligent injuries are today insured risks lessens the force of the
'Clayton v. United States, 284 Fed. 537 (C. C. A. 4th, 1922) ; Allen v. United States,
194 Fed. 664 (C. C. A. 4th, 1912).
'No living witness is necessary to the corpus delicti (i) When the person charged with
perjury is shown guilty by documentary evidence originating from himself, (2) When the
perjury is contradicted by a public document known to the accused when he took his oath.
United States v. Wood, 4o U. S. 43o (184o).
10TFx. Rzv. CRnt. STAT. (1925) § 786. Plummer v. State, 35 Tex. Crim. Rep. 202, 33S. W. 228 0I895).
' Ex parte Metcalf, supra note 4.
"State v. Cerfoglio, supra note 4.
"There is language in the opinion from which it might be inferred that if the subject
matter had not been capable of direct proof circumstantial evidence would have been
sufficient.
'I Br_ CoMM 443; (1919) 59 U. OF PA L. REV. 411.In equity, bills for the protection of a married woman's property could be brought
against her husband and in some instances actions in contract. 3 STORY, EQUITY JURIS-
PRUDENCE (14th ed. 1918) §§ 1795, 1796.a I Scaou=L , MARRIAGE, Divoacp SEPARATION AND DoxEsTic RELATIo (6th ed.
19212 § 633.
2 Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611, 31 Sup. Ct. II (191o); Strom v. Strom, 98
Minn. 427, io7 N. W. lO47 (i9o6); Rogers v. Rogers, 265 Mo. 200, 177 S. W. 382 (1915).
Contra: Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 Atl. 889 (1914) ; Gilman v. Gilman, 78 N. H. 4,
95 Atl. 657 (1915) ; Fiedler v. Fiedler, 42 Okla. 124, 140 Pac. io22 (1914).
'Newton v. Weber, 119 Misc. 24o, 196 N. Y. Supp. 113 (1922); nor may an action be
brought after divorce for a tort committed during coverture; Lillienkamp v. Rippetor, 133
Tenn. 57, 179 S. W. 628 (1915).
' See cases cited, supra note 4.
'For vigorous arguments against the view denying tort actions between the spouses,
see the dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan in Thompson v. Thompson, supra note 4 at
61g, 31 Sup. Ct. at 113; Shumaker, Actions for Tort Between Husband and Wife (1926)
30 LAv NOTES 165.
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argument in great measure. Since, in the instant case, the court admits that no
action would be maintainable against the husband,8 the permission of a suit
against the employer tends to the inference that the court regards the non-liability
of the husband as a procedural matter, when in fact the language employed by
other courts seems to justify the conclusion that it is a matter of substance."
If the latter view is correct, in strict logic, no liability should have been attached
to the defendant. The court, however, was probably influenced by the fact that
the policy which forbids the suit in the ordinary case is absent when the burden
of the damages is being borne by a third party. Nevertheless in preference to
the determination of the case on its peculiar ground of liability, it would perhaps
have been better to discard a rule which rests on scant reason and an outworn
social concept.
INSU1RANCE-INCONTESTABILITY CLAUSE-ATTEMPTED SUICIDE AS A DE-
FENsE-Plaintiff sued for disability' benefits under an insurance policy, after
having totally disabled himself in an unsuccessful attempt to commit suicide
while sane Held, that, notwithstanding the incontestability clause, it was against
public policy to allow recovery. Elwood v. New England Mutual Life Insurance
Co., 158 Atl. 257 (Pa. 1931).
The sanctity of the incontestability clause as proclaimed by insurers has
generally been sustained by the courts.' An outstanding illustration is the
allowance of recovery by the majority of courts where the insured dies by his
own hand while sane, recovery being predicated on the theory that the state of
mind which induces suicide is a covered risk.' The remaining courts deny the
incontestability clause as precluding the defense of suicide and, for the most part,
follow the federal court view that suicide is an implied exception to the contract,
in the event that it has not been expressly made such.3 Some of these latter
courts, however, distinguish between the situations where the estate of the insured
is the beneficiary and where not,4 illogically allowing recovery in the second
instance.5 With these precedents, the apparently novel situation arises where
8 At 755.9 See Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304 at 3o6 (1877). "The theory upon which the present
action is sought to be maintained is, that coverture merely suspends and does not destroy the
remedy of the wife against her husband. But the error in the proposition is the supposition
that a cause of action or right of action ever exists in such a case. ' There is not only no
civil remedy but there is n6 civil right, during coverture, to be redressed at any time"; see
also Phillips v. Barnet, I Q. B. D. 436 (1875).
1 The accepted view of the incontestability clause is that by reason of its presence the
contract becomes absolute after a certain period except for non-payment of premiums and
the fact that the insurer can show the risk is not the one which he covered. -Reagan v.
Union Mutual Life Ins. Co., i89 Mass. 555, 76 N. E. 217 (1905); Sipp v. Phila. Life Ins.
Co., 293 Pa. 292, 142 Atl. 221 (1928) ; VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1-3o) SI8.
-Morton v. Supreme Council, ioo Mo. App. 76, 73 S. W. 259 (1903); Marcus v.
Heralds of Liberty, 241 Pa. 429, 88 Atl. 678 (1913). Cf. Morris v. State Mutual Life
Assurance Co., 183 Pa. 563, 39 At'. 52 (1898). Some jurisdictions achieve this result by
statute. 6 CoucH, INSURANCE (1930) § 1262b.
'For federal view see Ritter v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., I69 U. S. 139, 18 Sup. Ct. 300
(1898) as limited by Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 254 U. S. 96, 41 Sup.
Ct. 47 (1920).
'Shipman v. The Protected Home Circle, 174 N. Y. 398, 67 N. E. 83 (1903); see
Morris v. State Mutual Life Assurance Co., supra note 2, at 572, 39 Atl. at 55. Contra:
Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. McCue, 223 U. S. 2.34, 32 Sup. Ct. 220 (1912). In
the case of Hartman v. Keystone Ins. Co.. 21 Pa. 466 (1853) the court sustained a charge
to the jury that in the absence of express provision excepting suicide, the suicide by the
insured is a fraud on the insurer, preventing recovery.
'That such recovery is illogical see Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. McCue,
supra note 4.
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the attempt to commit suicide. while abortive, results in total disability. Under
a contract providing for disability benefits in such a case, recovery might logi-
cally be allowed, as a matter of contract law, under the majority view. An over-
riding public policy would seem to direct the opposite result, however." Thus,
in the principal case the court held that even though it is a bona fide attempted
suicide which fails, recovery must be denied to prevent opening the door to false
claims of attempted suicide, nothing more than self-maiming being attempted.7
This conclusion is derived from the possible evil resident in the fact that the
insured himself would recover in the case of disability benefits. s Aside from
the precedents, the policy of sustaining the integrity of the incontestability clause,
suggests that recovery be allowed in bona fide suicide cases, even though it may
entail recovery in fraudulent cases. The viewpoint of the present court, however,
was evidently fixed on the protection of insurance as a necessary social institu-
tion rather than on an inflexible maintenance of the inviolability of the incon-
testability clause.'
LANDLORD AND TENANT-TORT LIABILITY OF A LANDLORD FOR FAILURE
TO PERFORM COVENANT TO REPAIR-The defendanb landlord having covenanted
to keep premises in repair, failed to do so, though notified by the tenant of a
defect. Sometime thereafter, as a consequence of the defect, the tenant's minor
child was injured. The suit was in tort, based on the negligence of the
defendant. Held, that a breach of a covenant to repair does not subject the
landlord to liability for personal injuries to the tenant or his immediate family.
Timmons v. Williams Wood Products Corporation, 162 S. E. 329 (S. C. 1932).
The present case presents a problem upon which the authorities differ.-
The weight of jurisdictions, in accord with the principal case, recognize only
contractual liability.2  The reasons given are: (I) a tort results from the viola-
tion of a duty imposed by law rather than from a violation of a duty created
See 6 CoucH, op. cit. supra note 2, § I2 6 2j.
'The instant case is a strong one for recovery: (I) all the evidence showed the attempt
to commit suicide was bona fide; (2) the insured was heir to an estate of more than
$15o,oo, which was being settled at the time of the attempted suicide, whereas the disability
benefits, requiring total disability to collect, were but $ioo per month; (3) the contract not
only contained an incontestability clause but also a clause stating that the defense of suicide
was only available to the insurer for one year, and the former was operative, time having
run on the latter.
I The difference in the temptation in suicide and attempted suicide cases is of slight
degree, but the possibility of success is greater in the latter case and attended with less
hardship in achievement. This distinction is not new, see the minority rule, supra notes 4
and 5. Perhaps, also, there is a tendency for those trained in the common law to start
their reasoning in a new situation, such as this, from the basis that attempted suicide is a
crime and hence contrary to public policy. Whether ignored as a reason for the result or
not, the effect may be more to readily adopt a position against recovery. See principal
case, at 259.
OThe problem here is whether the policy of the incontestability clause should alone be
sufficient to allow recovery. This policy is that when the insured has paid for protection
and the time for the needed protection arrives that no technical defense, attended by costly
litigation, shall bar the way to recovery of benefits. But, if it is true that insurance in a
social institution, a far-sighted policy preventing this social institution from being under-
mined by attacks through the medium of false claims successfully pursued against its re-
serves, seems meritorious.
I BOHLEN, CASES ON ToRTs (3d ed. 1930) 439-442. I TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT
(1910) 592. As to injuries to the property of the tenant, see (193o) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 94.
'Supra note I. Damages recoverable for a breach of the landlord's covenant to repair
are ordinarily limited to the difference between the rental value of the premises with repairs
and their rental value without repairs. I TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT, supra note I,
589. The damages resulting from injuries to the tenant's person or property are too remote
to be recovered in an action on the covenant.
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by the parties; ' and (2) a third party who failed to repair would not be subject
to tort liability.4 On the other hand, a considerable number of courts have
reached the opposite result.5 Fictions have been employed in the process. One
court thought that since the covenant to repair gives the landlord the privileges
of an owner-occupant, he is under the same duty as an owner-occupant." An-
other court has said. that the law superimposes a duty which is ultra contract,
and gives rise to an action in tort.7 Avoiding these cumbersome methods of reach-
ing a result, a Tennessee case has flatly stated that the duty arises out of the
contract, and that this does not prevent it from being culpable negligence. s The
affirmative duty to repair arises out of the benefit to the landlord in the use of
the premises in addition to all the essentials of a tort duty being present. More-
over a practical reason suggests itself-the greater financial ability of the land-
lord to remedy the defect, which would appear to make the minority rule more
desirable socially. The immediate case is the first pronouncement on the point
in South Carolina, and its result is somewhat surprising. It was thought that
the modern trend was in favor of the minority view,9 and it was expected that
courts confronted with the problem for the first time would follow such ten-
dency, especially since the Torts Restatement of the American Law Institute is
in accord.' 0
MORTGAGES-MORTGAGEE COMPLETION BOND--MEASURE OF DAMAGES-
Plaintiff held a first mortgage on a piece of land owned by X.1 X wished to
finance the construction of a garage, and induced plaintiff to subordinate her
mortgage to a first construction mortgage, executing to her, as additional secu-
rity, a completion bond with defendant company as surety. An injunction was
secured by neighbors restraining the erection of the garage, and the first mort-
gagee foreclosed. Plaintiff's mortgage was wiped out at the sale, and her defi-
ciency judgment against X being unsatisfied, she brought this action against de-
fendant company on the bond. Held (Kephart, J., dissenting), that plaintiff
Si TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note I, 593. Harkrider, Tort Liability of a Landlord (1928)
26 MicH. L. REv. 260, 383.
"This argument has evoked the reply that granting its validity, there is no reason to
extend it to a factual situation under which it would constitute bad law. Harkrider, op. cit.
supra note 3, 399, n. 163.
'Supra note i.
Barron v. Liedloff, 95 Minn. 474, 475, 1O4 N. W. 289, 29o (I9o5). "... where the
landloid agrees to repair and keep in repair the leased premises, his right to enter and have
possession of the premises for that purpose is necessarily implied, and his duties and lia-
bilities are in some respects similar to those of an owner and occupant. And if his negligence
in making or failing to make the repairs results in an unsafe condition of the premises, he
is liable for injuries caused thereby to persons lawfully upon the premises, who are not
guilty of contributory negligence on their part."
'Ashmun v. Nichols, 92 Ore. 223, i8o Pac. 51o (i919).
S Merchant's Cotton Press and Storage Co. v. Miller, 135 Tenn. 187, 195, 186 S. W.
87 (1i6). "Instead of the duty being law-imposed, it is self-imposed. The fact that the
duty is voluntarily taken on should n6t detract from its scope and effect, or lessen the
implication which the law will make. Such a duty on nonobservance may constitute the
culpable negligence that is the basis for an action sounding in tort."
'Harkrider, op. cit. supra note 3, 399.
"ToRTs RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1928) § 227.
'Plaintiff sold her land to X for $85,ooo, taking back a purchase money mortgage for
$6oooo. X made the purchase through Y, a straw man. The construction mortgage, to
which plaintiff subordinated her mortgage, was for $8oooo, the contract price of the build-
ing. The surety bond was for-6o,ooo, the amount of plaintiff's mortgage. Of course,
plaintiff's rights against X and Y were valueless; both judgments were unsatisfied.
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could recover, and the measure of damages was the cost of completion. 2 Purdy
v. Massey, et al., 159 Atl. 545 (Pa. 1932).
The proper measure of damages for breach of the condition of a comple-
tion bond has been the source of considerable confusion in the law. Where the
bond is posted for the benefit of the owner, the courts uniformly hold that he
is entitled to the premises in the state in which it was agreed they -should be
placed. In case of default, therefore, the owner may recover the difference
between the value of the property in its uncompleted form and the value it
would have had were the construction completed.3 This is a simple application
of the general rule as to measure of damages for breach of contract; the injured
party should be placed in the same position as if there had been no breach. How-
ever, as Justice Kephart very pointedly brings out in his dissenting opinion,
there is a marked distinction between the interest of a mortgagee and that of
an owner. The mortgagee's interest in the property is only for security pur-
poses; his recovery, if any, must be limited to the injury to his security. The
Federal District Court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 4 recognized the
difference in the two cases and awarded only nominal damages to the mortgagee
where it was shown that the value of the property at the date of the breach
was sufficient to cover the plaintiff's mortgage. The court, in so many words,
said that the recovery should be limited to the amount by which the value of
the mortgage had been impaired. This amount is to be ascertained by taking
the value of the property if the construction had been completed, and using so
much of this value as exceeded the value of the property at the time of the
breach, as would cover the plaintiff's mortgage. Apparently, therefore, the
anomalous situation is presented of the State and Federal Courts of the same
jurisdiction reaching directly opposite results. No doubt the court in the prin-
cipal case was influenced by the hardship on the plaintiff.6 On principle, the re-
sult of the Federal case is sound. The interest of the mortgagee is different
from that of an owner, and the mortgagee should sustain the burden of showing
an actual impairment of his security before he could recover on the bond. Other-
wise, the surety company would be indemnifying the mortgagee from loss by
the general decline of real estate values. It is conceivable that the damage
suffered by the plaintiff in the instant case was equal to the cost of completion.
However, in the absence of a specific showing that if the construction had been
completed the value of the property would have been sufficiently enhanced to
prevent the plaintiff's mortgage from being wiped out, there ought to be no
recovery. As Justice Kephart points out, the bond would then be for the pro-
tection "of a non-existent interest".
PROPERTY-FUTURE INTERESTs-AccELERATION OF REMAINDER UPON RE-
LEASE BY THE LIFE TENANT-Testator devised his property in trust to pay four
specified annuities for life, and at the death of the named annuitants, the entire
estate to a hospital. In 1882, a petition to set aside a sufficient sum to pay the
2The curt adopted the rule as to measure of damages laid down in Mechanics Trust
Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 304 Pa. 526, 156 Atl. 146 (i931). On the subject of com-
pletion bonds and construction mortgages generally, see Note (1930) 79 U. OF PA. L.
REV. 202.
'Union Indemnity Co. v. Vetter, 40 F. (2d) 6o6 (C. C. A. 5th, I93O) ; Haney v. Ferch,
I50 Minn. 323, 185 N. NV. 397 (1921).
"Trainor Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 49 F. (2d) 769 (E. D. Pa. 1931), with
an excellent opinion by Judge Kirkpatrick. In accord with this result see Province
Securities Corp. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 269 Mass. 75, 168 N. E. 252 (1929).
r49 F. (2d) at 773.
"Unless plaintiff can recover on this bond she will have received $25,ooo for the
property which she sold for $85,ooo, and she will have suffered a loss of $6oooo and interest
thereon through no fault of her own." At 546.
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annuities and to transfer the balance to the hospital was refused., In 1913 the
sole surviving annuitant acquiescing, a similar petition was presented and re-
fused.2  Some years ago later this annuitant released her life estate to the re-
mainderman. Held, that the remainder was accelerated.3 Derbyshire's Estate,
Pa. Sup. Ct., decided February 3, 1932.
The same principles should apply to remainders of personalty as to those
of realty.4 The problem should likewise not differ because the remainder is to
a charitv rather than to an individual.5 That the remainder in the instant case
was vested no one refuted, since where there is an estate for life to one, with a
remainder in fee to another, the latter's estate is considered as vested even though
his enjoyment thereof is dependent upon his surviving the life tenant.6 It has
been consistently maintairied that only the continuation of the particular estate
postpones the possession of a vested remainder,7 hence our inquiry in the instant
case must be as to when the particular estate determined. Where there is a life
estate to one, and at his death a remainder to another, the courts have construed
"at his death" to mean "at the termination of his life estate, whenever and how-
ever that may occur".' Thus the remainder has been held to vest in possession
where the first taker has refused to take the gift, as frequently happens when
a widow elects to take against the will ;O or when the first taker has no capacity
to take; 10 or where he dies before the testator."- It would seem, then, that upon
the release of the surviving annuitant's life estate in the instant case the re-
mainder vested in possession.2 Although the courts have labored greatly as to
the effect to be given the intention of the testator, it has been suggested that
his intention is important only in determining whether the remainder is vested
or contingent.13 If contingent, the right to possession is postponed because the
remainderman has no estate but only a possibility of an estate.:4 If vested, the
remainder vests in possession upon the determination of the particular estate.
Pennsylvania courts have however, in apparent disregard of this principle,
'Biddle's Appeal, 99 Pa. 525 (1882).
- Derbyshire's Estate, 239 Pa. 389, 86 Atl. 878 (1913).
'This was an appeal from an opinion of the Phila. Orphans' Court, decided Dec. 14,
1931, reaching the same result, but only because of the Act of April x4, 1931, P. L. 29,
which permitted vested remainders to charitable associations to be accelerated. Two judges
dissenting, the statute was held to operate retroactively. The per curiam opinion in the
instant case did not mention the statute. Under the view here suggested, no statute would
have been necessary to permit acceleration.
'Lainson v. Lainson, IS Beav. I (Eng. 1853) ; Jull v. Jacobs, 3 Ch. D. 703 (1876);
I JARMAN, WI.LS (6th ed. i91o) 72o.
Stafford's Estate, 258 Pa. 595, o2 Atl. 22 (I917).
'Welliver v. Jones, 166 Ill. 8o, 46 N. E. 712 (1897) ; KAL.ES, FUTURE INTERESTS (1920)
§ 330; I TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (1920) 491.
GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (3d ed. 1915) § IOI; TIFFANY, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 476, 520; 2 WASHBURN, REAL PROPERTY (6th ed. 19o2) § 1541; Note (1921) 30
YALE L. J. 849.
SYeaton v. Roberts, 28 N. H. 459 (5854) ; KALES, op. cit. supra note 6, at § 599; TIF-
FANY, op. cit supra note 6, at 520.
'Hesseltine v. Partridge, 236 Mass. 77, 127 N. E. 429 (192o); Yeaton v. Roberts,
supra note 8; In re Disston's Estate, 257 Pa. 537, IOI Atl. 804 (1917) ; Re Scott [19ii]
2 Ch. 374. See Simes, The Acceleration of Future Interests (3932) 41 YALE" L. J. 659.
As to the result when the widow's election affects residuary legatees, see (1932) 8o U. OF
PA. L. REv. 454.
' Jull v. Jacobs, supra note 4; Key v. Weathersbee, 43 S. C. 414, 21 S. E. 324 (1894).
'Hollister v. Butterworth, 71 Conn. 57, 40 Atl. 3O44 (1898) ; Huber v. Mohn, 37 N. J.
Eq. 432 (883).
The enjoyment of an equitable remainder and the possession of a legal remainder are
governed by the same principles. TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 6, at 522.
1 TiFFANY, op. cit. supra note 6, at 521; Note (I9z4) 9 IowA L. BUL. 313. But it has
been held that the intent of the testator will determine whether or not a remainder will be
accelerated. Swann v. Austel, 261 Fed. 465 (C. C. A. 5th, 3919) ; Blatchford v. Newberry,
99 Ill. ii (188o) ; Holdren v. Holdren, 78 Ohio St. 276, 85 N, E. 637 (19o8).
"' TIFFANY, loc. cit. supra note 13.
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made acceleration depend upon the intent of the testator. It has been held that
where the purpose of the trust was merely to protect the corpus pending the
duration of the life estates, the trust will be determined when such purpose has
been accomplished even though the trust has not expired in time."5 But when
the continuation of the trust was necessary to effectuate a material intent of the
testator, such as accumulation, there will be no termination before the time
named, 16 and it was so held in the prior adjudications of this will. But once
it is conceded that the remainder is vested, even the testator's intent should not
prevent acceleration. Although the result in the instant case is consistent with
.this doctrine, the decision was unnecessarily placed on the ground that the trust
was no longer active, and acceleration thus permissible-and this notwithstand-
ing the prior holdings in this case to the effect that the testator intended to accu-
mulate the fund until the death of the last surviving annuitant. While the
conclusion is desirable, the per curiam opinion prevented a really satisfying dis-
cussion of the principles here noted.
SALES-BAILMENT LEASES-PENNSYLVANIA CONDITIONAL SALES AcT-L
contracted with the plaintiff for certain gasoline pumps to be installed in a
building which L was erecting for the defendant. The contract, in terms, de-
clared that the pumps were being leased to L. Upon completion of the building,
defendant paid L in full. Plaintiff now sues to recover the pumps. Held, that
the transaction was a conditional sale and that the retention of ownership was
ineffectual against defendant. Bowser & Co. v. Franklin Mtge. and Inv. Co.,
305 Pa. 459, 158 Atl. 170 (1931).
Although Pennsylvania has adopted the Uniform Conditional Sales Act'
thereby enforcing conditional sales agreements if recorded, 2 it has specifically
excepted bailment leases from such regulation 3 contrary to the provisions
'Coover's Appeal, 74 Pa. 143 (1873); Culbertson's Appeal, 76 Pa. 145 at 148 (1874);
Woodburn's Estate, 151 Pa. 586, 25 Atl. 145 (1892); Stafford's Estate, supra note 5; cf.
Sharpless' Estate, 151 Pa. 214, 25 Atl. 44 (1892). In the Culbertson case, the court said,
". .. no matter what may be the nominal duration of an estate given to a trustee, it con-
tinues in equity no longer than the thing sought to be secured by the trust demands" and
when that demand has been fully satisfied, "although a trust may not have ceased by expira-
tion of time . . ., yet, if all the parties who are or who may be interested in the trust
property are in existence and are sid juris, and if they all consent and agree thereto, courts
of equity may decree the determination of the trust . .
" Biddle's Appeal, supra note i; Derbyshire's Estate, supra note 2; Spring's Estate,
216 Pa. 529, 66 At. l1O (19o7).
'PA. STAT. (West Supp. 1928) § I9727a.
2 Prior to the act, conditional sales were void as against third parties. Martin v.
Mathiot, 14 S. & R. 214 (Pa. 1826); Rose v. Story, i Pa. i9o (1845). In Brunswick &
Balke Co. .v. Hoover, 95 Pa. 508, 512 (i88o), it was said: "There is no principle of law
better settled in Pennsylvania than that a sale and delivery of personal property, with an
agreement that the ownership shall remain in.the vendor until the purchase money is paid,
enables creditors of the vendee to seize and sell the same for the payment of his debts." The
basis for this rule, as laid down by Tilghman, C. J., in Martin v. Mathiot was that since a
sale without delivery of possession to the buyer is void as to a third party under the famous
Statute of 13 Eliz., any separation of the possession and property in goods is fraudulent;
therefore a conditional sale must be void since the seller delivers possession to the buyer
but retains the title to the goods until payment of the purchase price or fulfillment of the
condition. The view has been taken that conditional sales became valid in Pennsylvania
upon the adoption of the Uniform Sales Act, PA. STAT. (West 1920) § 19749, in 1915
although the Conditional Sales Act was not passed until 1925. Mueller, Conditional Sales
in Pennsylvania since the Adoption of the Sales Act (1924) 72 U. OF PA. L. REV. 123.
'Bailment leases were valid even though unrecorded before the Act. Rowe v. Sharp,
51 Pa. 26 (1865) ; Enlow v. Klein, 79 Pa. 488 (1875) ; Dibman v. Cottrell, 125 Pa. 6o6, 17
At. 504 (1899).
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adopted by the Uniform Laws Commission.4 Therefore it is still important in
Pennsylvania to distinguish between bailment leases and conditional sales. In
determining this matter the court goes to the real intent of the parties: The mere
fact that the agreement is expressed in terms of lease and rental is not conclu-
sive.6 The contract must provide, either expressly or by implication, for the
return of the bailed article at the termination of the lease; 7 and the time of such
termination must be definite,8 even though it be accelerable at the option of the
lessee. In the principal case the period of the bailment, thirty days, was found
to have expired before the plaintiff had installed the pumps.' It is important,
moreover, that the bailment should be for use and not for sale because if the
bailee has authority to sell, the bailor should be estopped from asserting his title
against an innocent purchaser."0 In the instant case, the evidence showed that
the plaintiff knew, at the time of delivery of the goods to the builder, that they
were t6 be installed in defendant's building, which might readily be construed
as an implied authority to sell to the defendant. It must be shown also that
the installment payments provided for in the lease bear some relation to the
actual rental value of the leased chattel.11 The contract in the principal case
provided for a single payment of the full market value of the pumps. Clearly
the parties to the contract in question intended the bailment lease form to be
but a camouflage for an unrecorded conditional saleY.
2
WILLS-ABATEMENT OF LEGACIES-MEANING OF "REMAINDER OF PRIN-
CIPAL'--Otlt of a trust fund of a fixed sum, the testator bequeathed several
specific legacies to certain nieces and nephews, and then left "the remainder of
'Subsection 2 of section i of the Uniform Act, is omitted in the Pennsylvania Condi-
tional Sales Act. It provides: "Conditional sale means . . . any contract for the bailing
or leasing of goods by which the bailee or lessee contracts to pay as compensation a sum
substantially equivalent to the value of the goods, and which it is agreed that the bailee or
lessee is bound to become, or has the option of becoming, the owner of the goods upon full
compliance with the terms of the contract." The effect of this section is to place bailment
leases under the same requirements of recording as affect conditional sales and thus to
eliminate the necessity for determining, in a given transaction, whether the parties intended
a conditional sale or a bailment lease.
'For a more detailed study showing the difficulty of any generalization as to the rules
which the courts of Pennsylvania follow in this matter, see Montgomery, The Pennsylvania
Bailment Lease (1931) 79 U. oF PA. L. REv. 92o.
'Stern v. Drewer, 285 Fed. 925 (D. C. 1922) ; Root v. Republic Acceptance Corp., 279
Pa. 55, 123 Atl. 65o (1924). In several cases a bailment lease construction has been
repudiated by the court because the parties inadvertently inserted in such a bailment agree-
ment words of "purchase" or "sale" or similar words: Brunswick & Balke Co. v. Hoover,
supra note 2; Bank of Secured Savings v. Rudolph, 83 Pa. Super. 439 (1924). In the
principal case evidence was admitted which showed that the parties in their correspondence
referred to the pumps as "sold."
'Enlow v. Klein, supra note 3; Edwards' Appeal, io5 Pa. 1O3 (1884); Federal Sales
Co. v. Kiefer, 273 Pa. 42, 116 Atl. 545 (1922).
'Stern & Co. v. Paul, 96 Pa. Super. 112 (1928).
'The subject matter of a bailment lease must be a chattel. Duhrkop Oven Co. v.
Tormay, 9 F. (2d) 281 (C. C. A. 3d, 1925); Ott v. Sweatman, 166 Pa. 217, 31 Atl. 102
(1895).
"°Hoeveler Stutz Co. v. Cleveland Motors Co., 92 Pa. Super. 425 (1927); Stern & Co.
v. Paul, supra note 8.
" In Stern v. Drewer, supra note 6, where one-half of the full contemplated purchase
price was to be paid in advance and the remainder in fort-, installments, the'court adopting
the law of Pennsylvania, refused to hold the contract to be a bailment lease.
" Even if the sale had been recorded, it is doubtful whether the plaintiff would have
been able to successfully maintain the action against the defendant. PA. STAT. (West Supp.
1928) § I9727a-9. provides that where the conditional vendor consents to a resale of the
goods by the vendee prior to the performance of the condition a reservation of title by the
vendor is void even if recorded. As heretofore stated it was established in this case that
the plaintiff knev that the goods were to be incorporated in the building being erected for
the defendant.
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said principal of said trust fund" to another niece. Thereafter, the trust fund
proved insufficient to pay even the specific bequests. Held, that both the specific
gifts and the gift of the remainder of the fund should abate pro-rata. Provident
Trust Co. of Philadelphia v. Graff et al., 157 Atl. 920 (Del. 1932).
In the absence of explicit testamentary provision,' the normal rules of dis-
tribution enunciate that all legacies of the same class reduce proportionately,
2
and that legacies of different class abate in the following order: residuary gifts
before those which are general in nature, and general gifts before those which
are specific.3 The reason underlying the latter principle is that the decedent
designs to bequeath in a true residuary clause only that residuum of his property
which remains after previous gifts have been satisfied.4 Another interpretation
was given to the word "remainder" in the principal case, wherein it was deemed
the equivalent of a gift of an aliquot portion of a particular fund. The Eng-
lish r and most of the American courts C faced with this situation have reached
a similar conclusion. On theory, once it is admitted that the residue of an
ascertained sum is tantamount to a specific bequest, both must be treated as
gifts of the same category, subject to ratable abatement. One Pennsylvania
court has distinguished narrowly between the remainder of a stipulated fund
and the residue of a deposit described generally without being estimated in
figures.7 The holding in the instant case is open to the criticism that since
the legatee of the residue of a predetermined fund would receive any surplus
which should accrue, as would a real residuary legatee, he should, to perfect the
analogy between the two, be subject to the same prior abatement in case of a
deficiency. On the other hand, the instant ruling may well be substantiated
on the equitable ground that since the testator presumptively intended to benefit
all of the donees equally by giving them definite fractional interests in a stated
fund, each legacy should abate pari passu with the next in the event of an inade-
quacy of assets.
'Any express provision in the will as to changes in the distribution in case of an in-
sufficiency will, of course, govern. Elmore's Estate, 292 Pa. 571, 141 Atl. 478 (1928)
Hotaling v. Marsh, 132 N. Y. 29, 3o N. E. 249 (1892).2 1, re Espy, 207 Pa. 459, 56 Atl. 1005 (19o4) ; Shuld v. Wilson, 225 Ill. 336, 8o N. E.
259 (igo7) ; Emmons, Ex'r v. Dow, 191 Mass. 170, 77 N. E. 310 (19o6). Cf. In re Small-
man's Will, 138 Misc. 889, 247 N. Y. Supp. 593 (1931); and Matter of Neil, 238 N. Y. 138,
144 N. E. 481 (1924) (declaring that general legacies to near, dependent relatives will be
preferred over other general legacies). On this point, see Note (1925) 34 A. L. R. I245.
'Powell v. Labry, 21o Ala. 248, 97 So. 707 (1923). 2 PAGE, WiLS (2d ed. 1926) §
1315: "Specific legacies do not abate until residuary legacies and general legacies have
abated, in the absence of a contrary intention as manifested by the will or surrounding cir-
cumstances." A specific legacy is usually defined as a gift of certain of the testator's per-
sonal property, so described as to be capable of identification at the testator's death. Stephen-
son v. Dowson, 3 Beav. 342 (Eng. 184o). A residuary legacy is a gift of what remains
after paying debts and other legacies. Berry v. Dunham, 2o2 Mass. 133, 88 N. E. 904 (igog).
'PAGE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 1311.
'Miller v. Huddlestone, L. R. 6 Eq. 65 (1868); Page v. Leapingwell, i8 Ves. 463
"Eng. 1812). JARMAN, WnLS (6th ed. igio) 2o83: "If the testator states that the fund
amounts to a particular sum, and gives specific amounts to one or more persons, and the
residue or surplus to another, the gift of the residue is, as a general rule, treated as a
specific gift of what it would have been if the fund had produced the amount stated by the
testator." Cf. Harley v. Moon, i Drew. and Sm. 623 (Eng. 1861).
'Van Nest's Ex'r v. Van Nest, 43 N. J. Eq. 126 (i887); Alsop v. Bowers, 76 N. C.
168 (1877) ; Harker v. Reilly, 4 Del. Ch. 72 (187i). PAGE, op. cit. supra note 3, 2186:
"If it [a gift of the residue of a fund] is a true residuary gift, it abates before other gifts
out of such fund; while if it is a residuary gift in form only, and intended as a gift of a
fraction of the entire fund, all of the gifts out of the fund abate pro rata."
IBarrett's Est., 22 Pa. Super. 74, 75 (903): "'A bequest of the residue of a specific
fund is specific, where the testator estimates the residue in money, his intent being to appor-
tion the fund among the beneficiaries.' . . . though the fund is in fact definite in amount,
if the testator merely describes it generally, without estimating it in figures, the gift of the
residue is not specific."
